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ABSTRACT
The objects of this investigation are to examine the following mechanism of embankment dams for irrigation damaged by the 1995
Hyogoken-Nanbu Earthquake; 1) the mechanism and process of collapse for the Idenoshiri-Ike embankment dam using the effective
stress earthquake response analysis; 2) the mechanism of upper slope failure for the Sugatadani-Ike embankment dam using the total
stress earthquake response analysis as well as the slope stability analysis with seismic intensity. As a result, the following conclusions are
obtained for each objects; 1) the mechanism and process of collapse due to liquefaction can be analyzed that the liquefied areas initially
occurred at the toes of upper and lower slopes are extended and connected to make flow downward the volume of embankment and that
the result of this analysis is consistent with the real damaged situation; 2) the mechanism of upstream slope failure can be explained only
with considering the increase of excess pore pressure in the upstream slope, not extending complete liquefaction, using the both analyses.

INTRODUCTION
In Hyogo Prefecture, there were about 51,000 embankment
dams for irrigation, especially in Awaji Island, about 24,000
ones are located. Due to the strong ground motion of the 1995
Hyogoken-Nanbu Earthquake, many embankment dams were
suffered severe damage such as sliding failure of upstream slope,
longitudinal cracks occurred on dam crest and slope, etc.
Fortunately, only two embankment dams, Idenoshiri-Ike and
Niteko-Ike, were catastrophically failed, and no secondary
disaster was occurred. Figure I shows a relationship between
the closest distance from the fault line and the number of
damaged embankment dams for irrigation in Awaji Island and
Honshu Island. About 950 embankment dams were damaged in
Awaji Island as they were very close to the epicenter of the
earthquake. Fig.1 shows that all of these damaged dams were
distributed within 10 km from the fault line. The Idenoshiri-Ike
dam located in the northwest part of this island was suffered a
catastrophic failure of the central part of the dam due to soil

liquefaction. This causeof failurewasestimated
by observing
many sand boils on the reservoir bed. On the other hand, Fig.1
shows that many damagedembankment dams were distributed
over IO to 25 km distance from the fault line in Honshu Island.
The Sugatadani-Ike dam was located in the southeast of Ono
City in Hyogo Prefecture, about 26 km far from the fault line.
This dam was suffered a sliding damage of the whole upstream
slope. It is noted that there were many embankment dams
suffered the same damage as the Sugatadani-Ike one, but no
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Fig. 1. Relationship betweenthe closest distancefrom thefault
line and rhe number of damaged embankmentdams

damssufferedslidingdamageof downstream
slope.
In this paper, the failure mechanism of the two embankment
dams mentioned above were examined by different analyses;
the Idenoshiri-Ike dam was analyzed with an effective stress
earthquake response analysis; the Sugatadani-Ike dam with a

total stress earthquake response analysis as well as a slope
stability analysis with horizontal seismic coefficient.
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The mechanism and process of the collapse of Idenoshiri-Ike
embankment dam by soil liquefaction during the 1995
Hyogoken-Nanbu Earthquake was examined by an effective
stress analysis. The Idenoshiri-Ike dam is located in the
northwestern part of Awaji Island. It was a homogeneoustype
earth-fill dam with 155m long, 5.5m high, and 17,500m storage
capacity of reservoir. At the time of the earthquake, the ceter
part of dam collapsed completely; many cracks in the
longitudinal direction appeared as showing in Fig.2. A
cross-section of collapsed embankment and SPT N-value are
also shown in Fig.2 [The Department of Agriculture, 19961.
Soil liquefaction of the foundation ground was supposedto be
the causeof the failure becausemany sand boils were observed
on the reservoir bed and at the downstream paddy field.
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Fig. 4. Input motion
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Fig. 2. Cross section of Idenoshiri-Ike embankmentdam
Analytical Procedure
The effective stressanalysiscode for two-dimensional problems,
TARA- [Finn et al, 19861,was employed. A hyperbolic model
was used for shear stress-shear strain relationships and
declinations of shear modulus and shear strength with
decreasing effective stress was taken into account.
Development of excesspore water pressure was computed by
the two parameters model, which was modified from
Martin-Finn-Seed model [Martin et al, 19781. The FEM model
is shown in Fig.3. Since no acceleration record was obtained in
Awaji Island, the record obtained at Kobe University during the
1995Hyogoken-Nanbu Earthquake was usedas an input motion.
A maximum acceleration was adjusted to be 441Gal (0.45g)
basedon the maximum accelerationsevaluated from the falling
down of tombstone tumbles. An input acceleration time history
is shown in Fig.4.
The model parametersfor the analysis are shown in Table I.
The liquefaction parametersfor the two parametersmodel were
decided by simulating the liquefaction strength obtained by
cyclic triaxial tests of undisturbed samples. A comparison
betweenthe test and the simulation is shown in Fig.5; and these
are agreedvery well. No test data was available for the alluvial
Paper No. 5.27
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Fig. 5. Liquefaction strength
sandy gravel layer, development of excess pore water pressure
in this layer was not considered becauseSPT N-value is very
large to be more than 47 as seenin Fig.2.
Discussion
Liquefied areasare shown in Fig.6. Time histories for response
accelerationare shown in Fig.7, and ones for excesspore water
pressure in Fig.8. Judging from analyzed displacement, the
whole embankment moves toward the downstream side. From
theseresults obtained by the analysis, the processof the collapse
of this embankmentdam is estimated as follow;
a) Until about 3.5 seconds passing from the beginning of the
earthquake,amplification of accelerationfrom the bottom to the
crest is about two times as shown in Fig.7 and the liquefaction
doesn’t occur in all elements (as seenin Fig.6).
b) During 3.5-4.0 seconds,the element El (see Fig.8) near the
upstream slope is liquefied, then elements in the downstream
side are liquefied. The liquefaction area expands in nearby
areasin the subsequentlarge pulse at about 4.5 seconds.
c) Liquefied area expands to the center part until 7 seconds
when input acceleration shows peak values. At 7 seconds,
liquefaction area form upstream to downstream sidesjointed,
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The failure mechanism of the Sugatadani-Ike embankment dam
damaged by the 1995 Hyogoken-Nanbu
Earthquake was
examined by slope stability analysis based on the static seismic
coefficient method and earthquake response analysis. These
analyses were carried out using characteristic values obtained
from surveys such as boring tests conducted after the earthquake.
The results evaluated from such analyses are in good agreement
with the actual damage, and the conditions caused the failure of
this embankment are clarified.

Overview of Damage
The Sugatadani-Ike embankment dam is located on a hill with
elevations of about 90m in the southeast area of Ono City in
Hyogo Prefecture. It was a homogeneous type earth-fill dam
with 98m long and 12m high. Fig.9 shows an overview of the
cross section of this damaged embankment. The water level of
reservoir during the earthquake was about half of the design
high water level, and the upstream slope was damaged by the
slide along the whole length of the embankment dam with gaps
of about 4m at the crest.

^ -400
3
400
g 200
z0
; -200
2 -400
2 400
200
0
-200
400
400
200
0
-200
-4001.

,
0

,

,

,

,

.

,

,

,

5

,

,

.

.

.

10
Time

15

(s)

Fig. 7. Acceleration time history
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Since the closest distance from the fault line to this embankment
dam was estimated to be 26.4km. from the relationship between
the horizontal acceleration and the closet distance from the fault
line in the region [Toki et al, 19951, the maximum acceleration
at the site is estimated to be approximately 200Gal (0.2Og)
(160Gal (0.16g) for stiff ground and 230Gal (0.23g) for soft
ground). It is considered that liquefaction was not caused due to
the earthquake because of the acceleration was relatively small
and no sand boils were observed near the reservoir.
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Fig. 8. Pore water pressure time histoy
resulting in very week layer of the bottom of the embankment
dam.
The failure of the embankment dam is supposed to be caused by
the formulation of this week layer (liquefied layer).
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Fig. 9. Damage of the Sugatadani-Ike embankmentdam
[The Department of Agriculture, 19961
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Determination of Characteristics Values

Table 2 Soil profile of the dam and the foundation stratum

Several tests such as laboratory soil test, boring test, PS logging,
in-situ soil density test, and in-situ permeability test were
conducted after the earthquake in order to obtain the
characteristic values of the foundation stratum and the
embankment. The soil profile of the embankment and the
foundation stratum are shown in Table 2. The embankment
consisted of sandy soil with N-values ranging from 4 to 17. The
calculation and analysis were carried out using the cross section
at the center of the embankment. The soil properties used for the
earthquake response analysis and the static seismic coefficient
method are shown in Table 3 and Fig./O. The strength
parameter of the embankment was estimated from the triaxial
compression tests, and that of the foundation stratum was
estimated from the N-values. The initial shear modulus Go was
determined based on Vs from PS logging, and the
strain-dependency with respect to the shear modulus and the
damping ratio was estimated based on the existing literatures.

Ground
stratum
Embankmenr

Alluvial
sand layer
Foundation
ground

-0
0.5
0.4 n

Soil type

N-value

Sandy gravel with clay.
Gravel is matnly 0.3 - 1.5cm round gravel.
Under the embankment contains a lot of gravels.
Ip(Plasticity Index)=13. F.C.=30%
Less fme grained coarse sand include gravel.

4-17
20

Sandy gravel with clay.
Gravel is mainly 0.3 - I .5cm round gravel.
Matrix is hardened sand with clay.
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Eouation for calculating safety factor. Safety factor Fs was
calculated using in the Design Specification for Dams (revision)
by incorporating the effect of excess pore water pressure [Japan
Commission on Large Dams, 19781,

Amolitude of shear strain v
Fig. IO. Strain-dependency of embankment andfoundation
Evaluation by the Static Seismic Coefficient

Method

Estimation method for excess nore water pressure. Fig. II
shows the relationship between pore water pressure ratio Lu and
liquefaction resistance factor FL used for analysis. The
liquefaction resistance factor FL was calculated from the
specifications on the literature (see Fig.1 1).

IX (c 1 + (N-U-Ne-Ue)tan

$)

Fs=

(1)
C (T+Te)
where, in each slice used for the stability analysis,
c, +: strength parameters for the slip surface, 1: slip surface
length of the slice, N,T: vertical and tangential component of the
load acting on the slip surface, Ne,Te: vertical and tangential
components of the seismic load acting on the slip surface, U:
pore water pressure-induced load acting on the slip surface, Ue:
excessive pore water pressure-induced load acting on the slip
surface ( = d u 1,n u: excess pore water pressure).

Table 3 Soil properties used in analvsis [Tateishi, 19961
Item

* Depth is the distance from the ground surface
** RI : Cyclic triaxial strength ratio [Japan Road Association,
*** d 1 initial damping ratio
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Relationship between horizontal seismic coefficient and safety
factor. The solid lines in Fig. 12 show the relationship between
safety factor Fs, which was obtained from equation (1) by
assuming Ue=O, and horizontal seismic coefficient Kh. The
calculations are conducted with only a circular arc given the
minimum safety factor where Kh=O.l. The shape of seepage
surface was calculated by saturated and unsaturated seepage
analysis. As shown in Fig. 12, the safety factor of the
downstream slope is smaller than that of the upstream slope,
with the limit horizontal seismic coefficient Khc (horizontal
seismic coefficient for Fs=l.O) for the upstream slope being
0.29, and Khc for the downstream slope being 0.23. Considering
that the maximum ground acceleration at the site was
approximately
2OOGa1(0.2gj, the upstream slope of this
reservoir theoretically should not collapse if the horizontal
seismic coefficient is about 0.2. In addition, the lower safety
factor for the downstream slope contradicts the fact that the
failure occurred only on the upstream slope. Records of this
earthquake also show that there were several cases where the
upstream slope of the embankment or the whole embankment
collapsed, but no case where only downstream slope collapsed.
This indicates that the above calculation based on the static
seismic coefficient method cannot explain the actual damage,
where only the upstream slope collapsed. The possible reason
for this is that the effect of excess pore water pressure was not
taken into consideration in the above calculation.
The dot lines in Fig.12 show the relationship between Fs, for
which the effect of excess pore water pressure du obtained
from Fig.11 is taken into account, and Kh. In this figure, the
effect of d u is observed, where Kh is equal to or larger than 0. /
for the upstream slope, and equal to or larger than 0.2 for the
downstream slope. Khc is 0.15 and 0.2 for the upstream slope
and downstream slope, respectively. Therefore it can be
concluded that the cases where only the upstream slope
collapses can be explained by static seismic coefficient method
if the effect of pore water pressure is taken into account.

Evaluation bv the Earthquake Response Analysis
Total stress earthquake response analysis. The earthquake
response analysis was carried out based on the equivalent linear
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and horizontal seismic coeflcient

method (FLUSH). The main-shock record (EW component) of
the earthquake observed at the Kobe University was used for the
input ground motion at the site with modifying to have a
maximum acceleration of 20OGa1(0.2g). In the mesh model
used for finite element method analysis, the left and right ends
are set to be the energy-transmitting boundary, and the bottom
end (foundation stratum) to be the viscous boundary.
The safety factor for the total stress analysis was calculated
using shear and normal stresses acting on the slip surface, which
can be determined by the composite stress of dynamic and static
stresses (the stress obtained from static FEM analysis where the
self-weight and buoyancy acting on the embankment). The
symbol 0 in Fig.12 shows the relationship between Fs at,
before, and after such a time that the safety factor becomes
minimum, and the horizontal seismic coefficient which is
equivalent to the average horizontal inertia force acting on the
slip mass, Khe. For the upstream slope, the Fs-Kh relationship
obtained from the earthquake response analysis is in good
agreement with that obtained from the static seismic coefficient
method. For the downstream slope, however, the Fs-Kh
relationship by the earthquake response analysis falls above the
curve obtained from the static seismic coefficient method.
Judging from the maximum value for Khe shown in Fig. 12, the
actual maximum horizontal seismic coefficient is expected to
have been approximately 0.18. This roughly agrees with the
equivalent value of the coefficient
calculated from the
maximum ground motion acceleration (=2OOGa1(0,2g)). It
should be noted, however, that where the horizontal seismic
coefficient is about 0.18, Fs is calculated to be about 1.3 and
this does not agree with the actual condition of failure.
Effective stress response analvsis. The effective stress response
analysis
(TARA-3) was carried out to verify the mechanism of
upstream slope failure. Fig. I3 shows the distribution of excess
pore water pressure obtained from this analysis. This figure
indicates that excessive pore water pressure tends to develop
near the upstream slope. It can also be seen from this figure that
the location where the excess pore water pressure ratio develops
close to 0.9 is limited to a small area near the surface of the
upstream slope, so liquefaction of the whole embankment does
not occur. The symbol A in Fig.12 shows Fs, for which the
effect of excess pore water pressure obtained from the effective

5

Fig. 13. Distribution

of excess pore water pressure rutio

As described above, it was found that the embankmentdamage
where only the upstreamslope collapsed could not be explained
without the development of excess pore water pressure in the
upstream slope of embankment during the earthquake. It is
therefore concluded that the collapses of embankment caused
by the increaseof pore water pressureas well as the low shear
strength of the embankmentmaterials.
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20m

AU / o,,, ’ obtained from the effective stress response analysis

( AU : excess pore water pressure, o,,, ’ : mean principal

stress analysis was incorporated into the results of the total
stress responseanalysis. When the effect of excess pore water
pressureis considered,Fs is calculated to be approximately 1.0
for the upstream slope and more than 1.0 for the downstream
slope, which is in agreementwith the actual casewhere only the
upstreamslope collapses.
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CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, the mechanism of the collapse for the two
embankment dams for irrigation, Idenoshiri-Ike and
Sugatadani-Ike,were analytically examined. For the former, the
effective stressearthquake responseanalysis was used, and for
the latter, the slope stability analysis using the static seismic
coefficient method and earthquake response analysis. As a
result, the following conclusions are obtained.
1) The mechanism and process of collapse due to soil
liquefaction can be analyzed that the liquefied areas
initially occurred at the toes of upper and lower slopes are
extended and connected to make flow downward the
volume of embankment, The result of this analysis is
consistent with the real damagedsituation.
2) The mechanismof upstream slope failure can be explained
only with considering the increase of excesspore pressure
in the upstreamslope, not extending complete liquefaction,
using the both analyses.
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